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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2)(j). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the trial court err in ruling that the limitation of a therapist's duty to warn under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78- 14a-102(1) barred all claims against the defendant arising out of an 
injury caused by the violent behavior of a patient, including claims arising out of negligent 
performance of an affirmative act? 
Preservation: This issue was addressed in defendant's memorandum and reply 
memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss (R. 15; R. 70), and in plaintiffs' 
memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss. (R. 36.) 
Standard of review: The motion was filed and briefed as a motion to dismiss under 
U.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). "A trial court's decision granting a rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a 
complaint... is a question of law that we review for correctness, giving no deference to 
the trial court's ruling." Oakwood Vill L.L.C. v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101,^ [ 9, 104 
P.3d 1226. "A dismissal is a severe measure and should be granted by the trial court only 
if it is clear that a party is not entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be 
proved in support of its claim." Colman v. Utah State LandBd, 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 
1990). 
In its memorandum decision, the trial court stated, "As it is necessary for the Court 
to analyze facts not found in the pleadings, Defendant's motion will be treated as a 
motion for summary judgment." (R. 109.) The court did not specify the facts to which it 
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referred, but presumably it was the call to dispatch that forms the basis of the complaint. 
Plaintiffs are not certain that listening to a call that is referenced and incorporated in the 
complaint converts a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. In any event, 
however, when reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the Court analyzes the facts and 
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party. The trial court's decision is reviewed for correctness. Swan Creek Village 
Homeowners Ass'n v. Warm, 2006 UT 22,H 16,134 P.3d 1122. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14a-102(l): 
A therapist has no duty to warn or take precautions to provide protection from any 
violent behavior of his client or patient, except when that client or patient 
communicated to the therapist an actual threat of physical violence against a 
clearly identified or reasonably identifiable victim. That duty shall be discharged 
if the therapist makes reasonable efforts to communicate the threat to the victim, 
and notifies a law enforcement officer or agency of the threat. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
This action arose when Officer Mark Robinson was shot by a patient while at the 
defendant clinic. Plaintiffs filed their action on January 30, 2006, alleging that plaintiff 
Mark Robinson was injured because defendant affirmatively misstated during a telephone 
call that the patient had no weapons. (R. 4.) 
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss under U.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) on February 14, 
2006, arguing that the defendant had no duty to protect Officer Robinson. (R. 12.) 
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Before plaintiffs response was due, defendant filed a Supplemental Citation of Authority 
in support of its motion to dismiss, citing the trial court to Fordham v. Oldroyd, 2006 UT 
App 50, 131 P3d 280, in which the Court of Appeals adopted the professional-rescuers' 
rule ("fireman's rule") in Utah. (R. 32.) Plaintiffs subsequently filed an opposing 
memorandum (R. 36), and defendant filed a reply. (R. 70.) No discovery has been 
undertaken in the case. 
The trial court heard oral argument on May 22, 2006. During the oral argument 
process, the dispatch call referenced in the complaint was made available to the court. 
On July 18, 2006, the trial court issued a memorandum decision granting the 
defendant's motion to dismiss. (Because it had considered "facts outside the complaint," 
presumably the dispatch call, the court stated that it was treating the motion as one for 
summary judgment.) "The issue before the Court is whether Utah Code Annotated 
('UCA') § 78-14a-102(l) absolves Defendant of any liability by removing Defendant's 
duty to warn the officers or protect them from violent behavior by the patient," the court 
stated. (R. 94.) The court held that it did, because the plaintiffs alleged only a negligent, 
not intentional, misrepresentation. (R. 96-97.) 
After the memorandum decision was issued, the defendant submitted a proposed 
order that included an additional ground not contained within the trial court's ruling. The 
defendant's proposed order included language purporting to hold that "the duty of a 
citizen seeking assistance from a peace officer is limited by public policy," and 
incorporating all arguments in defendants' memoranda. (R. 104.) Plaintiffs objected to 
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the proposed order on the grounds that it went beyond the court's reasoning, which was 
limited to the effect of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14a-102(1). (R. 105.) On November 27, 
2006, the trial court signed the order proposed by plaintiffs, which eliminated the "public 
policy" argument raised by defendant. (R. 111-113.) 
Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal on December 21,2006. (R. 115.) 
Statement of Facts 
The facts alleged by plaintiff, and reasonable inferences therefrom, may be 
summarized thus: 
On October 4, 2002, plaintiff Mark Robinson was on duty in his capacity as an 
officer with the Logan City Police Department. (R. 5, % 7.) Defendant Mount Logan 
Clinic called dispatch and asked for officers to transport a suicidal patient, Craig Garrett, 
from the clinic to a behavioral health unit at Logan Regional Hospital. In response to the 
request, plaintiff Mark Robinson and fellow Officer Shand Nazer were dispatched to 
escort Mr. Garrett. (Id,% 8.) 
Charlotte Harris, a therapist at Mount Logan Clinic who was treating Mr. Garrett, 
knew, or should have known, that Mr. Garrett had a criminal history that included use of 
firearms and a domestic violence conviction. (R. 5, f^ 9.) Harris also had the following 
information at the time of the Clinic's call to the police department: 
• Mr. Garrett had waved a gun around in front of his wife and children 
at home, while making threats to kill himself. 
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• Mr. Garrett sometimes kept a gun in his truck and, before going into 
the clinic on the date of the shooting, October 4, 2002, he said he 
needed to go back to his truck. 
• Mr. Garrett was asked by Harris if he had a weapon and refused to 
deny that he was carrying a gun. Rather, he replied, "Maybe I do, 
maybe I don't." 
(R. 5,1f 10.) 
In spite of this knowledge, when the dispatcher specifically requested information 
regarding whether Mr. Garrett possessed a weapon, defendant said that he did not. (R. 6, 
f 11.)1 The Clinic acknowledges that this statement was incorrect. (R. 76.) 
When plaintiff and Officer Nazer entered Mr. Garrett's room, he immediately 
became confrontational. (R. 6, f 12.) It was only after the officers had entered Mr. 
Garrett's room that Harris finally told them that, contrary to her earlier representation, Mr. 
Garrett might have a weapon. She then left the room. (M, % 13.) 
Mr. Garrett then tried to leave the room by charging past Officer Nazer. In the 
ensuing scuffle, Nazer realized that Mr. Garrett had a handgun. (R. 6, J^ 14.) In the 
attempt to disarm Mr. Garrett, plaintiff Robinson was shot in the foot, causing him severe 
and permanent injuries. (R. 7, f 15.) 
The trial court's decision appears to quote the dispatch call when it relates the exchange 
as: Dispatcher: "He doesn't have any weapons or anything like that?" A: "No." (R. 
93.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There is a fundamental difference in the law between a failure to act and an 
affirmative act. As a general rule, a person has no duty to warn or protect others unless a 
special relationship exists between them. An affirmative act, however, inherently carries 
with it a duty of reasonable care. 
Plaintiffs' claims are based on an affirmative act by the defendant Clinic, Le., 
making a critical misstatement that the patient the Clinic wanted transported did not have 
any weapons. When summoning police or firefighters to a scene, individuals have a duty 
not to mislead officials about the nature of the hazard. This concept is so well entrenched 
in the law that it has long been recognized as an exception to the "firefighter's rale" that 
limits liability to professional rescuers. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14a-102(1) says that, except in specified circumstances, a 
therapist owes no duty to warn or take precautions to protect others from violent patients. 
In relying on Utah Code Ann. § 78-14a-102(1) to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims, the trial 
court erroneously assumed that plaintiffs' theories were based upon an alleged failure to 
act (warn, protect), rather than on a negligently performed affirmative act. The statute 
has no application to the plaintiffs' claims, and the judgment should be reversed. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT UTAH CODE 
ANN, § 78-14a-102(l) BARS PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS BASED UPON 
THE ALLEGEDLY NEGLIGENT PERFORMANCE OF AN 
AFFIRMATIVE ACT, RATHER THAN UPON AN ALLEGED 
FAILURE TO ACT. 
Defendant's motion to dismiss was based on the sole ground that Mount Logan did 
not owe plaintiffs a duty of care. (R. 12.) In particular, the Clinic argued that it had "no 
duty to warn or take precautions to provide protection from any violent behavior of his 
client or patient" (citing Utah Code Ann. § 78- 14a-102), and that "[a] person generally 
has no duty to protect another from harm inflicted by a third person" under the common 
law. (R. 19-29.) 
Before addressing this issue, it is important to clarify what plaintiffs are claiming 
as a basis for recovery, and what they are not. Plaintiffs do not claim that the Clinic 
breached a duty to warn or take precautions to protect Officer Robinson from the patient's 
violent behavior, or from harm inflicted by the patient. What plaintiffs do claim is that, 
regardless of whether it initially had any duty to act, when it did act, it had a duty to do so 
in a non-negligent manner. 
The California Court of Appeal has found similar allegations sufficient to state a 
claim for negligence. In Boon v. Rivera, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 276, 80 Cal.App.4th 1322 
(2000), the defendant summoned police to her residence when her husband barricaded 
himself within their home. The defendant affirmatively misstated to the police that her 
husband t4was not violent," even though she knew that he had access to guns and had 
7 
threatened to kill the first police officer who arrived. Relying on the representation that 
the husband was not violent, the plaintiff officer "responded with nonlethal force. If he 
had been told the true facts about the threat, he would have responded with different 
tactics and with lethal force." Instead, the husband was able to pull a gun and shoot the 
plaintiff before surrendering. 80 Cal.App.4th at 1326. 
The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. On appeal, the parties 
disagreed on whether the court's ruling was based on the so-called "firefighter's rule," or 
rather on the absence of a duty. Accordingly, the appellate court addressed both issues. 
The court first held that the firefighter's rule would not bar the plaintiffs claims because 
the claims were not based on conduct that necessitated calling the police in the first place, 
but rather "on misrepresentation of a known hazard to which emergency personnel were 
summoned." Id. at 1328; see also id. at 1329 (firefighter's rule did not bar claims that 
defendant "misstated material facts" to officer). The firefighter's rule has never 
immunized defendants from liability in that circumstance, the court noted. 
The court next addressed the issue of whether the defendant owed a duty to the 
plaintiff police officer. The court first noted that all persons have a general duty to use 
due care to avoid injury to others. Id. at 1330. (Although the duty is set forth in statute, it 
is essentially just a codification of the common law.) The court then noted that one 
section of the statute expressly "reimpos[es] a duty of ordinary care . . . which would 
otherwise be abrogated by the firefighter's rule." Id. Thus, the court noted, a duty of 
reasonable care was owed to the police officer the same as to other individuals. 
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Accordingly, the court then proceeded to examine the plaintiffs claim under ordinary 
duty principles. 
Like the Clinic in this case, the defendant in Boon argued that she had no duty to 
protect the police officer from the actions of a third party (her husband) absent the 
existence of a "special relationship" between the parties. Id. at 1331. The Court of 
Appeal rejected that contention, concluding that the defendant was confusing a claim 
based on failure to warn with one based on affirmative misrepresentation. Id. ("plaintiffs 
contend Milagro not only failed to warn, she made a materially false statement when she 
said her husband was not violent"). Whether the defendant had a special relationship or 
other affirmative duty to warn was irrelevant to plaintiffs claim, the court noted: The 
requirement of a special relationship "has no application where the defendant, through his 
or her own action (misfeasance) has made the plaintiffs position worse and has created a 
foreseeable risk of harm from the third person." Id. at 1332. 
"One who negligently or intentionally misrepresents the nature of a hazard to 
public safety officers may be held liable in damages for injuries sustained as a result of 
such misrepresentation," the court held. Id. at 1333, citing Lipson v. Superior Court, 31 
Cal.3d 362, 644 P.2d 822 (1982) (defendant who misrepresented that chemical boilover 
was not toxic was liable to firefighters who arrived unprepared for toxic chemicals); see 
also Daas v. Pearson, 319 N.Y.S.2d 537, 540 (Sup.Ct. 1971) (party reporting occurrence 
to police has common law duty to report facts with reasonable care). 
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As a final matter, the court considered an argument by the defendant that, under 
the circumstances, "it was not unreasonable for Milagro to fail to provide complete and 
accurate information to the police," and that "Plaintiff would have the Court believe that a 
reasonable person placed in Ms. Rivera's shoes would have the presence of mind to relate 
all incidents that might or might not be helpful to them, to the police within seconds of 
arriving on the scene." Id. at 1334, quoting the defendant's brief. The court summarily 
dispensed with that contention, noting that "whether or not certain conduct was 
unreasonable" is normally a question of fact. Id. The trial court's order granting 
summary judgment to the defendant was reversed. 
In this case, plaintiffs allege that defendant performed a negligent act in misstating 
a critical fact, namely that the patient did not have any weapons. As recognized in Boon, 
the approach taken by an officer is quite different depending on whether the third party is 
believed to be armed. The Clinic knew that the police would rely on its reassurance, and 
plaintiff did so to his detriment. 
The court below, however, held that Utah Code Ann. § 78-14a-102 barred all of 
plaintiffs' claims, stating: "Because there was no intentional misrepresentation by the 
employee, Defendant's duty to warn the officers was removed by UCA § 78-14a-102(l)." 
(R. 96.) In so holding, the trial court misapprehended the nature of plaintiffs' claims, 
which are not based upon an alleged failure to warn. Rather, the court blurred the critical 
distinction between "acts" and "omissions" under Utah law. As this Court recently stated, 
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[tjhe court of appeals correctly observed that as a general proposition of tort law, 
the distinction between acts and omissions is central to assessing whether a duty is 
owed a plaintiff. In almost every instance, an act carries with it a potential duty 
and resulting legal accountability for that act. By contrast, an omission or failure 
to act can generally give rise to liability only in the presence of some external 
circumstance—a special relationship. 
Webb v. University of Utah, 2005 UT 80, % 10, 125 P.3d 906. 
In the court below, the Clinic repeatedly characterized plaintiffs' complaint as 
alleging a failure to protect, which, had it been true, would fall into the failure-to-act 
category. See Webb, 2005 UT 80, % 15 ("Generally, the duty to protect is allied with the 
failure-to-act element of general negligence law. The duty of a private citizen to act in 
aid of another, the duty to protect, arises only where a special relationship is found to 
exist.") But that is not the theory by which plaintiffs claim a right to recover. As this 
Court has pointed out, "[U]nder ordinary negligence principles, the duty-to-protect 
concept has no application where a duty arises from an affirmative act." Id (emphasis 
added.) 
The common law has always distinguished between acting and failing to act. The 
Restatement provides some historical background: 
The origin of the rule [that generally there is no duty to protect others] lay in the 
early common law distinction between action and inaction, or "misfeasance" and 
"non-feasance." In the early law one who injured another by a positive affirmative 
act was held liable without any great regard even for his fault. But the courts were 
far too much occupied with the more flagrant forms of misbehavior to be greatly 
concerned with one who merely did nothing, even though another might suffer 
serious harm because of his omission to act. Hence liability for non-feasance was 
slow to receive any recognition in the law. It appeared first in, and is still largely 
confined to, situations in which there was some special relation between the 
11 
parties, on the basis of which the defendant was found to have a duty to take action 
for the aid or protection of the plaintiff. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 314 cmt. c. 
Every person who performs an affirmative act owes a duty not to injure others by 
performing the act negligently: 
In general, anyone who does an affirmative act is under a duty to others to exercise 
the care of a reasonable man to protect them against an unreasonable risk of harm 
to them arising out of the act. The duties of one who merely omits to act are more 
restricted, and in general are confined to situations where there is a special relation 
between the actor and the other which gives rise to the duty. 
Id9 § 302 cmt. a. 
These observations are consistent with the well-established principle that a party 
who assumes a duty not otherwise owed must do so in a non-negligent manner. "The 
common law recognizes a duty of due care on the part of an individual or entity that 
undertakes, whether gratuitously or for consideration, to perform a duty. . . . "Where one 
undertakes an act which he has no duty to perform and another reasonably relies upon that 
undertaking, the act must generally be performed with ordinary or reasonable care.'" 
Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 573 (Utah 1996) (stating that court did not have to 
decide whether city had duty to erect fence in waterway; once it chose to do so, city had 
duty to use reasonable care), quoting AmJur.2d Negligence § 208, at 255 (1989); 
Atkinson v. Stateline Hotel Casino & Resort, 2001 UT App 63, ffif 17-18, 21 P.3d 667 
(stating that court need not decide whether defendant casino owed plaintiff duty to 
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prevent harm from third party, because once defendant undertook such a duty, it had to 
act reasonably). 
The trial court's reliance upon Utah Code Ann. § 78-14a-102(l) to bar plaintiffs' 
claims was thus erroneous, because that statute addresses only the failure-to-act prong of 
negligence law, which is not at issue. It says that a therapist has no duty to warn or 
protect; it says nothing to exempt therapists from liability for negligently performing an 
affirmative act. 
Although the trial court did not adopt it, one final argument raised by the 
defendant warrants consideration. In its citation to supplemental authority, the Clinic 
directed the trial court to the Court of Appeals' ruling in Fordham, supra, which adopted 
the professional rescuers' rule in Utah. The Clinic acknowledged that the rule would not 
bar the plaintiffs' claims, claiming that 'the rule is cited only for purposes of the public 
policy considerations that have convinced other states to adopt the rule as a broad 
statement of duty[.]" (R. 81.) In light of the defendant's concession that the rule would 
not apply to the circumstances of this case, the issue of whether it is the law in Utah is not 
before the Court. 
However, the policy underpinnings of the professional rescuers rule actually 
support plaintiffs' position. Although varying rationale have been cited for adopting the 
rule, courts have consistently recognized that the policy considerations underlying the rule 
do not extend to situations in which the rescuer has been misled about the nature of the 
hazard, or the conditions for which he was summoned. See Boon, supra (holding that 
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fireman's rule did not apply where defendant misrepresented to police that her husband 
was not violent, after which husband shot plaintiff); Thomas v. Pang, 72 Haw. 191, 811 
P.2d 821, 825 (1991) (recognizing that fire fighter's rule would not apply if plaintiff 
alleged "that defendants misled the fire fighters regarding the condition of the building"), 
and cases cited; Calvert v. Garvey Elevators, Inc., 236 Kan. 570, 694 P.2d 433, 439 
(1985) (indicating that fireman's rule would not bar claim "for misrepresenting the nature 
of the hazard when such misconduct causes the injury to the fire fighter"); Pottebaum v. 
Hinds, 347 N.W.2d 642, 645 (Iowa 1984) (recognizing exception to fire fighter's rule if 
defendant misrepresents nature of the hazard). 
In adopting the professional-rescuer's rule, the Court of Appeals "emphasize[d] 
the doctrine's narrowness; it "bars only recovery for the negligence that creates the need 
for the public safety officer's service.' Therefore, the policy underlying the professional-
rescuer doctrine, even if valid, 'does not apply to negligent conduct occurring after the 
police officer or firefighter arrives at the scene or to misconduct other than that which 
necessitates the officer's presence.'" Id, quoting Moody v. Delta Western, Inc., 28 P.3d 
1139, 1141 (Alaska 2002). 
None of the allegations in the complaint involve any negligence that necessitated 
plaintiffs presence at the clinic. For example, plaintiff does not allege that defendant 
misdiagnosed the patient or committed some other error that caused the patient to become 
suicidal, thereby creating the need for police to transport him to another facility. Claims 
based upon such acts might well fall within the professional-rescuer rule (if ultimately 
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adopted by this Court), because such acts would have created the need for the officer to 
come to the scene. 
The misconduct at issue in this case was independent of, and subsequent to, the 
acts necessitating plaintiffs presence. U also continued after the police arrived, as the 
defendant perpetuated its earlier misrepresentation (that the patient did not have any 
weapons) until the officers had already entered the patient's room, when it was too late. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, plaintiffs respectfully request the Court to reverse 
the trial court's judgment, remanding the case for trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this £3d day of March, 2007. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
William J. H 
Karra J. Porter 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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ADDENDUM 
Memorandum Decision, July 18,2006 
Order, November 27,2006 
•JUL 1 ^; 2008 
IN THE FOIST DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARK ROBINSON and LORI 
ROBINSON, husband and wife, MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiffs, 
Civil No: 060100223 PI 
vs. 
MOUNT LOGAN CLINIC, LLC, Judge: Gordon J. Low 
Defendant. 
THE ABOVE MATTER is before the Court pursuant to the Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss. In preparation of its decision, the Court reviewed the Defendant's Motion with its 
accompanying memorandum, Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition, Defendant's Reply 
Memorandum, Plaintiffs' Complaint, and the applicable caselaw and statutory provisions. 
According to the undisputed facts, the case involves an incident that occurred on October 
4, 2002. On that date, Mark Robinson, acting in his capacity as a Logan City Policeman, was 
dispatched to Mount Logan Clinic. A certain employee of the Defendant ("Defendant's 
employee") called Logan City dispatch in connection with a suicidal patient, requesting officers to 
come escort the patient to a behavioral health unit at Logan Regional Hospital. During the call, 
Defendant's employee was asked by police dispatch, "He doesn't have any weapons or anything 
like that?" The employee responded, "No." After Robinson and his partner, Officer Nazer, 
arrived at Mount Logan, but before the physical confrontation with the patient began, Defendant's 
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employee warned the officers that the patient may have a gun. The officers then attempted to 
physically escort the patient. A struggle resulted and a gun concealed in the patient's waistband 
was, intentionally or unintentionally, discharged and struck Robinson in his foot. Plaintiffs then 
filed a Complaint against Defendant alleging negligence, personal damages, and loss of 
consortium. 
As it is necessary for the Court to analyze facts not found in the pleadings, Defendant's 
motion will be treated as a motion for summary judgment. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) 
provides, "...If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are 
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary 
judgment and disposed of as provided in rule 56..." 
The issue before the Court is whether Utah Code Annotated ("UCA") § 78-14a-102(l) 
absolves Defendant of any liability by removing Defendant's duty to warn the officers or protect 
them from violent behavior by the patient. 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
...The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law... 
When dealing with statutory interpretation the Utah Court of Appeals gave the following 
guidance: 
In construing a legislative enactment, the court's primary responsibility is to 
give effect to the intent of the legislature. Where statutory language is clear 
and unambiguous, we will not look further to divine legislative intent, but will 
construe the statute according to its plain language. 
State v. Singh, 819 P.2d 356, 359 (UT App. 1991). 
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UCA§78-14a-102(l) states: 
A therapist has no duty to warn or take precautions to provide protection 
from any violent behavior of his client or patient, except when that client or 
patient communicated to the therapist an actual threat of physical violence 
against a clearly identified or reasonably identifiable victim. That duty shall be 
discharged if the therapist makes reasonable efforts to communicate the threat 
to the victim, and notifies a law enforcement officer or agency of the threat. 
Plaintiffs argue that the statute does not have application in this case because there is no 
claim that Defendant owed Plaintiffs a general duty to warn or protect Robinson. Instead, 
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant had a duty not to affirmatively misrepresent the nature of the 
hazard when summoning police and an obligation to act reasonably upon assuming a duty. 
Plaintiffs argue that Defendant's employee affirmatively misrepresented the hazard when she 
responded, "No" to the dispatcher's question, "He doesn't have any weapons or anything like 
that?" Plaintiffs further claim that, even if initially Defendants did not owe Robinson a duty, 
once Defendant assumed the duty by contacting law enforcement, it had the obligation to 
exercise reasonable care. 
In contrast, Defendant argues that UCA § 78-14a-102(l) removes any duty it may have 
had to warn the officers because the only threat made by the patient was that he intended to kill 
himself. To Defendant, there were no other clearly identified or reasonably identifiable victims, 
and Defendant's employee informed law enforcement of the patient's suicidal tendencies. Thus, 
Defendant claims that any duty to warn it may have had was fulfilled by informing law 
enforcement of the patient's desire to commit suicide. Defendant also argues that public policy 
and the recently adopted "Fireman's Rule" favor imposing no liability for injuries sustained by 
law enforcement officers on those who summoned law enforcement. 
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Following the law stated in Singh, the Court must give effect to the intent of the 
legislature. The statute's language is clear and unambiguous in its removal of a therapist's duty 
to warn of a patient's violent behavior. The basis for Plaintiffs' claim rests entirely on the 
dispatcher's question and Defendant's employee's subsequent response. Plaintiffs classify 
Defendant's employee's response as an "affirmative misrepresentation." Plaintiffs made no 
clarification as to whether "affirmative misrepresentation" is equivalent to negligent or intentional 
misrepresentation. Negligent misrepresentation requires a mere duty to exercise reasonable care 
in giving information, and thus would not heighten the duty to the point of being outside of the 
confines of UCA § 78-14(a)-102(1). Rawson v. Conover, 20 P.3d 876, 883 (UT 2001). While 
situations of intentional misrepresentation may exist that remove a therapist's protection granted 
under UCA § 78-14a-102(1), in this factual situation, there is no evidence sufficient to support a 
claim for intentional misrepresentation. Consequently, Plaintiffs have not made such a claim. 
Therefore, Defendant owed Plaintiffs no duty to warn or provide protection from the patient. 
Furthermore, if the legislature intended a patient who makes a threat of suicide to be a clearly 
identified or reasonably identifiable victim, Defendant, through its communication to law 
enforcement that the patient was suicidal, fulfilled its duty to warn. 
Additionally, the question asked by the dispatcher, <cHe doesn't have any weapons or 
anything like that?" is ambiguous. The question assumes that Defendant's employee knew with 
certainty whether the patient had a weapon. Defendant's employee's response cannot be 
classified as an intentional misrepresentation because of the ambiguous nature in which the 
question was asked. Because there was no intentional misrepresentation by the employee, 
Defendant's duty to warn the officers was removed by UCA § 78-14a-102(l). 
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Finally, it is undisputed that before the physical altercation between the Patient and 
Plaintiff occurred, Defendant's employee informed Plaintiff that the patient may have a weapon. 
Though the facts as now before the Court do not state how much time before the physical 
encounter took place that the warning was given, it is undisputed that the warning was made 
before Plaintiff physically encountered the patient. Thus, as plaintiffs' claim for relief is based on 
the argument that Officer Robinson would have acted differently had he known that the patient 
had a weapon, the warning by Defendant's employee granted Officer Robinson an opportunity to 
change his tactics before physically engaging the patient. 
Therefore, as a matter of law, Defendant is absolved of liability, and its motion for 
summary judgment is granted. Counsel for Defendant is directed to prepare an order in 
accordance therewith. 
Dated this ( Q day of July, 2006. 
BY THE COURT 
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EST THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CACHE COUNTY 
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MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 060100223 
Judge Gordon J. Low 
This matter came before the Court pursuant to the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, which 
the Court treats as a Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 12(c), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The Court heard oral argument on Defendant's Motion on May 22, 2006. In addition 
to oral argument, the Court has reviewed and considered the legal memoranda filed by the 
parties, applicable case law and applicable statutory provisions. The Court, being fully informed 
and having previously entered its Memorandum Decision on July 18, 2006, finds and rules as 
follows: 
The following material facts are undisputed: 
NOV 2 5 2006 / 
.M 
On October 4, 2002, Mark Robinson, acting in his capacity as a Logan City Peace 
Officer, was dispatched to the Mount Logan Clinic as a result of a telephone call from an 
employee of the clinic ("Defendant's Employee") who had requested police assistance to escort a 
suicidal patient ("the patient") to a behavioral health unit at Logan Regional Hospital. During 
the call, Defendant's Employee was asked by police dispatch, "He doesn't have any weapons or 
anything like that?" Defendant's Employee responded, "No." After Officer Robinson and his 
partner, Officer Nazer, arrived at Mount Logan Clinic, but before the subsequent physical 
confrontation with the patient began, Defendant's Employee warned the officers that the patient 
may have a gun. Officers Robinson and Nazer attempted to physically escort the patient out of 
the clinic and a struggle ensued, during which a gun concealed in the patient's waistband was 
either intentionally or unintentionally discharged. A round from the gun struck Officer Robinson 
in the foot resulting in personal injury. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a Complaint against 
Defendant alleging negligence based upon the allegations that Defendant "breached its duty oT 
care to Officer Robinson" in "failing to ascertain whether [the patient] was carrying a concealed 
weapon; failing to disclose to the Logan City Police Department that Mr. Garrett had a history of 
violent behavior; failing to disclose to the Logan City Police Department information which 
would have put the police on notice that Mr. Garrett may have been carrying a gun; and 
affirmatively representing to the police that Mr. Garrett did not have a gun." (Plaintiffs' 
Complaint, ^ 17.) Based upon these allegations, Officer Robinson seeks damages for personal 
injury and his spouse, Lori Robinson, seeks damages for loss of consortium. 
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Defendant seeks dismissal on the basis that there is no legal duty owed to Plaintiffs. The 
Court agrees. The Court holds that any duty of Defendant's therapist and related agents is 
statutorily limited by § 78-14a-102(1). The Court holds that there is no legal duty to warn that 
was breached and that Plaintiffs' claims for negligence and "affirmative misrepresentation" fails 
as a matter of law under the undisputed facts of this case. Accordingly, and for just cause 
appearing, the Court hereby 
ORDERS AND DECREES that Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant be, and the same are, 
hereby dismissed with prejudice. Each of the parties shall bear his, her or its respective costs and 
attorney's fees incurred herein. 
Approved as to Form: 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
Elliott J. Williams 
Dennis C. Ferguson 
Robert C. Keller 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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